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I. Introduction
Financial markets, national and international, have witnessed a daunting
expansion in recent decades. Their rapid growth has been accompanied by massive
deregulation in many countries and a process of financial innovation, most notably the
development of new types of and new markets for financial derivatives. This has made
existing asset markets more liquid and has created new opportunities for trading
financial market risks, enabling investors to achieve a better degree of hedging
against these risks and, in doing so, to increase the value of the underlying assets.
Financial innovation and deregulation have also allowed financial institutions to move
beyond the borders of their traditional activities, making the differences between
banks, securities dealers, mutual funds, and insurance companies increasingly
blurred. 
As these developments change the nature and operation of financial markets,
an important question to ask is, what do they imply for the conduct and effectiveness
of monetary policy. The conventional answer offered in the literature holds that they
have but marginal implications. According to this view, financial innovations such as
derivatives allow banks to react faster to monetary policy shocks and, at the same
time, allow non-banks to protect themselves against such shocks to some extent. As
a result, the transmission of monetary impulses to the economy may become
somewhat weaker, but it remains unchanged in principle. A more radical view would
argue, however, that financial innovations, and the development of derivatives in
particular, have important implications for the nature of an economy’s monetary
system. More specifically, they imply a move towards a more perfect financial market
system, and one in which central bank money and its close substitutes lose their
unique role as generally accepted means of transaction. A relatively new literature has
begun to speculate about the nature of an economy where that occurs, and its
monetary policy implications.
The rapid expansion of derivatives markets has also caused policy makers and2
economists to worry about the potential threat they might pose to the stability of the
financial system. Popular views regard derivatives traders as players engaged in risky
bets and counter-bets, creating excess volatility of asset prices and interest rates and
threatening to disrupt the orderly functioning of the markets. More sophisticated
observers realize that derivatives enable financial institutions to circumvent traditional
regulation and to engage in new types of risky activities, and fear that they might
create excessive systemic risk. Furthermore, derivatives allow financial institutions to
circumvent regulation and assume more risk than their regulators would realize from
considering their balance sheets. Another important question is, therefore, how
derivatives markets should be integrated into the framework of financial regulation.
Since financial derivatives markets are global markets, an important aspect of this
question is, how such regulation can be implemented on an international scale. 
These are the main issues discussed in this paper. To set the tone, we begin
with a characterization of  the evolution of financial derivatives markets, the most
visible aspect of financial innovation, over the past 20 years in section II. In section III,
we discuss the economic functions of derivatives and derivatives markets. In section
IV, we turn to the monetary policy consequences of the development of a more perfect
financial system, assuming that the growing trend of derivatives markets will continue.
We argue that in a more perfect financial system, central bank money and fixed-price
bank deposits will eventually lose its role as the predominant means of transaction.
Hysteresis and the role of government in modern economies, however, will make sure
that central bank money retains its unit-of-account function. As a result, central banks
will lose much of their ability to use monetary policy to affect the real economy and
their attention will shift mainly to securing price stability. In section V, we discuss the
implications of an emerging, more perfect financial system for banking regulation. In
light of the conclusions in section IV, we argue that systemic risk will eventually
decline as a concern of regulatory policies, while the potential instability of individual
financial institutions, due to the classical principal-agent problems between depositors
and bank owners, will move to the forefront.  1 Although their recent growth has attracted attention, derivatives themselves are not new. An early
derivative product was a dual-currency bond offered by the Confederate States in 1863, with optional
convertibility of the principal into 40,000 pounds of cotton delivered on the Gulf of Mexico (Raisler, 1997). An
even earlier example are Japanese rice futures, which have been introduced in 1610 during the first Shogunate
(McKenzie, 1993).
2 The first futures traded at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1972 were foreign exchange contracts. The
CBOT also introduced the first interest rate future in 1975 (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 1993).
3
II. Derivatives and Derivatives Markets
Derivatives are agreements between two counterparties specifying the
exchange of cash payments based on changes in the price of a particular asset or
differences in the returns to different securities (e.g. Kuprianov, 1993).
1  They do,
therefore, derive their value from an underlying instrument. Derivatives can be
grouped into three categories, futures and forwards, options, swaps and other
derivative instruments.
2 As the latter can be decomposed into combinations of
forwards and options, the first two are considered “basic” instruments. A forward
contract is an obligation to buy or sell an underlying asset at a specified forward price
on a known date in the future. If the cash price at the expiration date of the contract is
higher than the specified forward price, the holder incurs a profit on her long position,
otherwise she incurs a loss. Forwards and futures thus generate symmetric risk
structures between the two counterparties to the contract.  In contrast, an option is the
right  to buy or sell (call vs. put option) an underlying asset at the strike price at a
known date in the future.  The owner can always choose not to exercise the contract.
Thus, options create asymmetric risk between the two parties to the contract. The
possible gain of the buyer is theoretically unbounded, while possible losses are
restricted to the size of the option premium. The seller, on the other hand, incurs a
potentially unlimited risk of loss and is compensated by a fixed premium (e.g. Issing
and Bischofberger, 1996). 
A swap is an agreement between two parties to swap, i.e. to exchange, future
cash flows based on different returns to or changes in the price of a specified
underlying. This is equivalent to the simultaneous selling and purchasing of the3 See Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (1993): The first ever swap contract was a currency swap involving IBM




3  Swaps are predominantly customized instruments, although
some swaps are now exchange-traded. The most common type is a so-called
„fixed/floating swap”, in which the „fixed-rate payer” agrees to make payments based
on a fixed, long-term interest rate to the so-called „floating-rate payer”. The latter,
analogously, makes payments indexed to a variable, short-term market interest rate.
The respective amounts to be paid are calculated on the basis of a specified principal,
which is commonly a notional amount. It is common to exchange the net difference of
payments only.
According to their degree of standardization, derivative contracts can be divided
into fully standardized, exchange-traded (ET) contracts and more customized, over-
the-counter (OTC) instruments that are traded in informal markets. Organized markets
cut the direct link between the seller and buyer. They have clearing houses serving as
the standard counterparty for all contracts traded. To reduce credit risk and provide
collateral for settlement payments, existing ET contracts are revalued at current
market values on a daily basis and market participants are required to make cash
deposits (margin requirements) before they are allowed to undertake transactions.
Daily losses and gains (variation margins) are then deducted or added to the deposit,
while a certain minimum deposit must be maintained.  These procedures together with
a high degree of standardization are designed to provide high fungibility and market
liquidity. Measures to reduce credit risk, such as thrid party guarantees, collateral
requirements and marking-to-market of existing contracts,  have arisen in OTC
markets as well, but the less formal nature of these markets implies that they are less
standardized and less developed than those in organized markets.  
Finally, derivatives can be distinguished according to the underlying assets:
Foreign exchange instruments, (single currency) interest rate contracts, equity, and
commodity contracts (BIS, 1996).   5
Since the mid-1980s, growth of turnover and notional amounts outstanding in
both the over-the-counter (OTC) and organized markets for financial derivatives, have
outperformed the growth in most other financial markets. From year-end of 1995 to
year-end 1996 notional amounts of globally outstanding interest rate swaps grew by
49% while currency swaps grew by 45% (BIS, 1998). ISDA figures for the first half of
1997 indicate that outstanding notional principal on OTC markets grew by about 42%
and 22% against end-June 1996 for interest rate swaps and currency swaps
respectively. The markets for interest rate futures and exchange-traded options, on the
other hand, grew 26% and 11% during 1997. The average annual growth rate of the
combined markets for OTC- and exchange-traded derivative instruments has been
40% over the ten years up to 1996 (IMF, 1997, 1996a). 
Measuring the size of financial markets is necessarily an elusive concept. Here,
we follow established practice and look at three aspects of market size: notional
contract values, gross market value of existing contracts, and turnover. 
II.1. Over-the-counter Markets for Derivatives
According to the 1995 survey conducted by BIS among the central banks in
twenty-six countries,  and after adjustment for double-counting, the global notional
amounts outstanding in OTC foreign exchange, interest rate, equity, and commodity
derivative contracts accounted for a total of US$ 40.6 trillion at the end of March 1995.
Including estimated gaps in reporting the figure even reaches a total of US$ 47.5
trillion (see Table 1).  All but 2% of this total is accounted for by interest rate and
currency instruments. Single-currency interest rate derivatives account for 60.7% of
the global OTC notional amount, whereas foreign exchange contracts make up
another 37.2%. Contracts based on equity and commodites account for only 1.3 and
0.8% respectively. The increasing linkage between domestic and international markets
and, hence, the global nature of trade in financial derivatives is accentuated by a
share of 55% of reported notional amounts outstanding involving counterparties from6
different countries (BIS, 1996) . 4 Notional amounts outstanding and gross market values of OTC contracts net of inter-dealer double-
counting (including estimated gaps in reporting).
5 N.a. = not available; amounts have been halved to approximate for double-counting. See BIS (1996),
p. 3.
6 Notional amounts outstanding are an indicator for market size and may also serve as an indicator for the
amount of potential exposure to price-risk being exchanged in the derivatives markets. Gross markets values,
however, measure the replacement values of the different derivative positions and do therefore indicate credit
risk. Because of netting arrangements (e.g. ISDA Master Agreement) credit exposure is probably even lower
than replacement values suggest. See BIS (1996), p. 24.
7 See GAO (1996), Appendix VII and Edwards and Mishkin (1995), pp. 35-37.
7
Table 1: Global Derivatives Markets at end-March 1995 (billions of US$)




6 47530 (100%) 8186 (100%)
of which
- foreign exchange  17700 (37.2%) 60 (0.7%)
- interest rate contracts 28850 (60.7%) 7835 (95.7%)
- equity contracts 630 (1.3%) 221 (2.7%)
- commodity contracts 350 (0.8%) 71 (0.9%)
gross market values 2205 (100%) n.a.
of which
- foreign exchange  1420 (64.4%) n.a.
- interest rate contracts 700 (31.7%) n.a.
- equity contracts 55 (2.5%) n.a.
- commodity contracts 30 (1.4%) n.a.
Source: BIS (1996); own calculations.
Banks and other financial institutions account for a large share of the combined
OTC markets, partly performing their role as suppliers of financial derivatives and
increasingly also trading on their own behalf.
7  Inter-dealer business in local and
cross-border trading accounted for about 57% of global notional amounts outstanding
in March 1995 (BIS, 1996).  In terms of notional amounts outstanding, interest rate
swaps, accounting for a share of 69%, appear to be the largest component of the OTC
markets for interest rate derivatives, followed by FRAs (17%), OTC options (13%), and
swaptions (1%) respectively. Forwards and swaps together account for 83% of the
notional amounts outstanding in the foreign exchange markets for derivatives, followed
by options with a share of 17%.8
Figure 1: Selected Derivatives Markets; notional amounts outstanding 












 Source: BIS (1998); IMF (1997, 1996a).
Table 2: Turnover in notional amounts; April 1995 
(daily averages; billions of US$)
category over-the-counter (OTC) exchange-traded
foreign exchange  720 (82%) 7 (1%) 
interest rate contracts 160 (18%) 563 (99%)
Total 880 (100%) 570 (100%)
  Source: BIS (1996); own calculations.
The gross market value of outstanding OTC derivatives amounted to US$ 2.2
trillion on 31
st March, 1995 (or roughly US$ 1.8 trillion without correction for estimated
gaps in reporting).  Although this is equivalent to only about 4.6 percent of the notional
amounts outstanding, it is nevertheless more than three times the capital of the
world´s 75 largest banks (IMF, 1996a). These global gross market values serve as an
indicator for the overall cost which would have been created had contracts had to be
replaced at market prices prevailing on 31
st March 1995. 
Foreign exchange products accounted for 64.4% of the gross market value,
interest rate contracts for about 31.7% and those contracts involving equity and
commodity prices 2.5% and 1.4% respectively. While forwards and swaps together
account for 93% of the gross market value of OTC foreign exchange derivatives,
swaps alone contribute a share of 87% to the replacement value of outstanding OTC8 Reported gross market values as a percentage share of reported notional amounts outstanding. The
“share” rises in the length of maturities and is smaller for lower volatilities of the respective underlying.
9 Percentage shares are based on reported turnover net of local and cross-border double-counting without
adjustment for estimated gaps in reporting.
9
interest rate contracts (BIS, 1996). 








Foreign exchange 100% 100% 8.0% 100%
- Forwards & swaps 83% 93% 9.1% 94%
- Options 17% 7% 3.0% 6%
- Other 0% 0% 16.4% 0%
Interest rates 100% 100% 2.4% 100%
- FRAs 17% 3% 0.4% 43%
- Swaps 69% 87% 3.0% 41%
- Options 13% 9% 1.7% 14%
- Other 1% 1% 3.2% 2%
Equity  36% 50% 8.6% n.a.
- Forwards & swaps 9% 14% 13.5%
- Options 91% 86% 8.2%
Commodities 100% 100% 8.8% n.a.
- Forwards & swaps 66% 78% 10.1%
- Options 33% 22% 5.5%
 Source: BIS (1996); own calculations.
The BIS survey estimates total average daily turnover (new transactions) in
notional amounts of OTC foreign exchange and interest rate derivative contracts at
US$ 880 billion in April 1995, about 82% of which was accounted for by foreign
exchange contracts. This runs counter to the relative size of the respective notional
amounts outstanding and is due to the longer maturities of interest rate products (BIS,
1996). 10
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 Data: daily averages in billions of US$; Source: BIS (1996).
II.2. Exchange-traded Derivatives
Reported notional amounts outstanding on exchanges totalled about US$ 16.4
trillion at end-March 1995. To adjust for double-counting the amount must be halved
and therefore reduced to a notional value of US$ 8.2 trillion. The global market for
financial derivatives, i.e. the combined markets for OTC and exchange-traded
contracts, amounted to US$ 55.7 trillion and was therefore roughly twice as large as
1995 world output. 
Between the end of 1986 and the end of 1997, the total notional amount of
outstanding ET derivative contracts grew at an annual average rate of 31% and stood
at $12.3 trillion at end-1997. During the same period, annual turnover rose from 315
million contracts to some 1.2 trillion contracts, or at an average annual rate of about
13%. Until recently, markets for ET products generally grew in line with OTC markets
(figure 1). In recent years, however, the growth of exchange-trade in derivatives has
been outpaced by the development in the markets for OTC instruments, which grew at
an annual average rate of about 45% (notional amounts outstanding) over the ten
years up to 1997, although figures for the first half of 1997 indicate a slowdown in10 See Kambhu et al. (1996), pp. 10/11; Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond (1993), p. 199.
11
Figure 3: Derivatives in Comparison
exchange-traded
OTC Derivatives






percent of world output
 Data: notional amounts, assets of BIS-reporting banks; Source: BIS (1996) and own calculations.
growth. (BIS, 1998; ISDA, 1997). 
Markets for ET derivatives are even more dominated by products involving
interest rates than OTC markets. Interest rate derivatives account for about 96% of
notional amounts outstanding in the markets for exchange-traded instruments.
Nonetheless, OTC interest rate markets are by far larger than interest rate business
involving exchange-traded derivatives. A share of 79% of organized interest rate
business falls to futures, while options account for the rest. In terms of daily averages
of reported turnover, interest rate instruments make up 99%, of which 89% fall to
futures. Generally, futures seem to be traded more actively than options. Interest rate
and foreign exchange futures account for 89% of daily April 1995 average turnover in
the combined markets for exchange-traded foreign exchange and interest rate
derivatives. Dealers seem to use futures to offset their net OTC exposures. Thus,
cross-market hedging using exchange-traded derivatives serves to meet hedging
demands generated by OTC activities.
10
II.3. Interest Rate Derivatives: Counterparties 12
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 Data: Notional amounts outstanding in trillions of US$; Source: BIS (1998, 1996).
Figure 4 illustrates the growth in the market for interest rate derivatives using
ISDA data on the market for interest rate swaps. A large and growing share of the
notional amounts outstanding in global interest rate swap markets is contributed by the
inter-bank (ISDA member) business, whose share increased from 30% of the total
volume in 1987 to 53% in 1996. Non-financial end-users  account for 11% (down from
18%), while the contribution of financial end-users declined from 44% of the total
amount to a share of about 33% over the same period (actually recovering from a low
of 27% in 1995). The share of the government sector, the least important player on
international markets for interest rate swaps, drops from 7% to a mere 3%.  
Table 4 sheds some light on the counterparty breakdown for all OTC interest
rate instruments. Reported notional amounts outstanding at end-March 1995 net of
local double-counting have been structured by type and counterparty. The table
provides figures for inter-dealer contracts and contracts between dealers and different
end-users. It is apparent, that markets for OTC interest rate derivatives are dominated
by inter-dealer business, with the market for FRAs being the segment of all OTC
markets which is most dominated by contracts between dealers. 
Turning to contracts involving dealers and end-users, the share of non-financial11 The respective shares for private sector corporations are 87% and 64% for interest rate and currency swaps,
respectively. 44% consider the use of derivatives very important, 37% imperative. (Group of Thirty, 1993).
12 GAO (1996) reviews the use of derivatives by 12 major end-user banks and thrifts. 64% of the notional
amounts of derivatives held were interest rate contracts, about 42% of which were used for hedging. Of all
instruments used for hedging, 99% were based on interest rates. While all reviewed firms were using derivatives
for hedging activities, 75% of them were also using derivatives for the purpose of dealing.
13
customers is especially small for FRAs, while options and swaps are used to a greater
extent. In contrast, end-users from the financial sectors are heavily engaged in the
OTC options business, with FRAs and swaps accounting for smaller shares. But
although significantly smaller than their options activities, their shares are
nevertheless bigger than the respective contributions of non-financial end-users.
Table 4: OTC Interest rate contracts by type and counterparty







FRAs 6559.5 13.8% 4.9% 81.3%
Swaps 24389.8 17.9% 12.8% 69.3%
OTC options 4390.9 27.9% 19.5% 52.6%
Total 356212 18.4% 12.2% 69.4%
 Source: BIS (1996); own calculations.
The Survey of Industry Practice conducted by the Group of Thirty (1993)
provides additional data on the derivatives use of financial institutions. About 92% of
the reporting financial firms indicated that they used interest rate swaps, with 54% and
46% of the same group using FRAs and currency swaps, respectively.
11 In the same
survey, more than 83% of the reporting financial firms considered the use of
derivatives either very important (24%) or even imperative (58%) for risk management.
A small survey conducted by GAO (1996) yields similar results.
12 The Group of Thirty
survey indicates that banks have become the dominant, though not the only group of
dealers on derivatives markets, and that there is a tendency of market concentration
among dealers. This is indicated by the observation that about 75% of the notional
turnover of each domestic derivatives market are covered by an average of only 10
market makers. Furthermore, some dealers fall in the group of top 10 dealers in more
than one country, confirming the tendency towards global concentration (Vrolijk,13 Total notional amounts outstanding net of inter-dealer double-counting.
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1997). Requirements of technology, know-how and expertise in appraising capital and
credit quality all contribute to this tendency. In this regard, Campbell and Kracaw
(1991) highlight the role of market making, i.e. the pooling of offsetting risks in large
derivatives portfolios. Gonzales-Hermosillo (1994) and Board et al. (1995) argue that
the tendency for market concentration is characterized by a growing market share of
high-quality dealers. They note that more than 90% of swap counterparties are triple-B
rated or above, while an increasing share of the market falls to so-called, structured
derivative product companies (SDPC) or special purpose vehicles (SVP). These
highly-specialized OTC derivatives dealers are legally separate subsidiaries of parent
firms and endowed with enough capital and operational procedures sufficient to gain
a triple-A credit rating (Remolona et al., 1996).
II.4. Interest Rate Derivatives: Maturity Structure
The maturity breakdown of global notional amounts of reported OTC derivatives
contracts outstanding points at a predominance of short- and medium-term
instruments. Table 5 provides information regarding the maturity structure of OTC
interest rate derivatives. The table shows a share of 44% for short-term interest rate
instruments, with medium-term contracts accounting for another 43 percent. The
proportion of interest rate contracts of maturities less than one year is the smallest for
interest rate swaps, while FRAs are predominantly short-term with a share of 88%
falling to the respective instruments.
Table 5: OTC interest rate derivatives by maturity
13
Contract-type Up to 1 year Over 5 years 1 < year # # 5
FRAs 88% 0 12%
Swaps 35% 16% 49%
Options 36% 14% 50%
Total 44% 13% 43%
All OTC instruments 56% 10% 34%14 Notional amounts (as of March 1995) net of local inter-dealer double-counting.
15 See BIS (1992), pp. 48-58; GAO (1996), Appendix VII.
15
 Source: BIS (1996).
This fact is supported by the „share“-variable reported in table 3 and seems to
reflect the wide-spread use of FRAs for hedging purposes related to short-term
interest rate risks. Breaking down the maturities of the other OTC derivatives markets
reveals that foreign exchange instruments are even more dominated by short term
contracts, with shares of 79% and 16% for maturities up to one year and between one
and five years, respectively. The same is true for equity and commodity based
products, where the respective shares amount to 44% and 43% for the equity based
markets, and 75% and 24% for commodity derivatives. Finally breaking down the
maturity structure for the combined OTC derivatives markets yields that only 10
percent of the notional amounts outstanding were for more than five years, while 56%
were for less than one year. 
II.5. Summary
Derivatives markets are becoming increasingly global, as suggested by a share
of 55% of reported notional amounts and about 75% of average daily turnover
involving counterparties from different countries. Figure 5 indicates the shares of
cross-border trades in the different OTC markets.
14 The data suggest that transactions
in swaps and FRAs are overwhelmingly between banks. Banks, therefore, seem to use
short-term interest rate swaps and FRAs to manage the interest rate risks created by
their portfolios.
15 16
Figure 5: Notional Amounts; OTC markets










 Source: BIS (1996) and own calculations.
Brewer et al. (1994) and Heinecke and Shen (1995) provide empirical evidence
showing that banks use derivatives in order to extend their traditional lending
activities. Specifically, they demonstrate a positive association between the use of
interest rate swaps and the growth in bank loans, concluding that derivatives are
complements to bank´s loan portfolios. Furthermore, however, banks seem to engage
in derivatives in order to offset the shortfall in profits coming from their traditional
business (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995).
III. Economic Functions of Derivatives
Financial derivatives allow investors to assume or lay off certain risks attached
to an underlying financial asset. Until recently, derivatives were used exclusively to
address market risks of the underlying assets, i.e., changes in the value of the asset
due to changes in markets prices and interest rates. More recently, “credit derivatives”
have emerged, which allow investors to assume or lay off credit risk, i.e. the risk of
borrower default on the underlying loans and other assets. Examples are „credit
default swaps” and „total-rate-of-return (TROR) swaps.” Trading in credit derivatives
is dominated by a small number of highly rated banks and largely restricted to a fairly16 Credit derivatives are not necessarily part of the swap market. The above mentioned credit default swap is
actually a put option on a portfolio of assets. See Federal Reserve Board (1996) and Neal (1996).
17
narrow range of sovereign and quasi-sovereign instruments.
16
In general economic terms, derivatives thus serve to achieve a more complete
financial system. Previously fixed combinations of the risk properties of loans and
financial assets can be bundled and unbundled into new, synthetic assets.
Repackaging risk properties in this way can  provide a more perfect match between an
investor’s risk preferences and the effective risk of her portfolio or cash-flow. In
addition, derivatives allow individual risk elements of an asset to be priced and traded
individually. This implies a more efficient price system in the asset markets, as
derivatives prices can signal changes in individual aspects of the pay-off profile of the
underlying asset that were previously merged with all other aspects. 
Beyond these general considerations, derivatives fulfill a number of more
specific  economic functions (BIS, 1994a; Issing and Bischofberger, 1996).  A first
function is to save transaction cost and allow a better exploitation of comparative
advantage. For example, two borrowers who can each obtain a better interest rate in
one market but need a loan in the other market can swap their interest payments,
allowing each to exploit the other’s cost advantage. In doing so, the use of derivatives
increases the value of the investors’ assets. 
A second function is to provide opportunities for hedging and more perfect and
cheaper portfolio diversification. Investors, both end-users and financial institutions
can use derivatives to stabilize interest payments over time and reduce their exposure
to interest rate and exchange rate shocks. Regarding the allocation of risks in the
economy, three cases can be distinguished (Issing and Bischofberger, 1996). The use
of derivatives facilitates the elimination of economic risks, when the parties to a
contract - or the end users in a chain of contracts - use it to hedge against opposite
risk exposures. Empirical evidence from the BIS (1996) survey of OTC markets
suggests that the vast majority of derivatives contracts serves to channel exposures to18
price risks from one end-user to another with offsetting demands, leaving dealers with
only small exposures to price risks in the aggregate (Kambhu et al., 1996; IMF 1996a).
The resulting credit risks seem to be rather small. The net credit exposure on swaps,
for example, is only about 1% of its notional principal (Hentschel and Smith, 1997).
Derivatives serve to achieve a more efficient distribution of risks between private
agents, if one party to a contract hedges against a risk and the other, the speculator,
assumes the corresponding exposure. Specializing in the acquisition and processing
of relevant information, the speculator will generally be better able to assume that risk
than her counterpart, so that the redistribution of risks enhances the economy’s
efficiency in coping with economic uncertainties and the aggregate risk is effectively
reduced (Darby, 1994). Both risk reduction and redistribution have positive welfare
and wealth effects in the economy.  
New risk is created if the parties to a contract are two speculators with different
expectations. The positive economic aspect of this case is that trade among
speculators with different expectations facilitates competition among agents with
different information sets and different specializations in gathering and evaluating new
information. Competition among profit-maximizing speculators assures that, in the
longer run, only those with efficient information technologies survive.
A third function of derivatives is that, by unbundling risks, their use creates
additional liquidity in asset markets. Santomero and Trester (1998) investigate
whether thie increased liquidity together with reduced communications cost leads to
increased risky lending by banks. They find that banks are willing to provide more
risky lending to finance real sector investment as a result of increased liquidity.
However, they argue that this does not imply increased riskiness of the banks. Rather,
banks have moved from greater exposure to external shocks to greater risk taking on
the returns of their assets. 
  A related point is that the possibility of tying derivatives notionally to a specific
asset implies that trading opportunities are not limited by the existing stock of the19
underlying asset. The result is, again, a positive wealth effect for the investor. 
A fourth function is to enable investors to devise investment strategies bridging
market segments that were previously separated. This implies an increase in the
substitutability of financial assets across a wide range of market segments and a
broader scope of arbitrage possibilities between markets (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1994). As a result, spill-overs of shocks from one market to others are increased and
the correlation of market developments in individual markets becomes stronger, but
the impact of an individual shock on the market where it originates is reduced.  
Finally, financial institutions can use credit derivatives to avoid a concentration
of their credit risk on particular groups of customers  without severing the customer
relationship, and to diversify portfolios by assuming risk exposures to different
borrowers without entering into new customer relationships. Thus, credit derivatives
allow banks to focus more strongly on their role as initiators of credit, and other
financial institutions to use the resulting credit risks to achieve a more suitable risk
structure of their portfolios.
Deregulation together with the greater liquidity and substitutability of financial
assets provided by derivatives markets have triggered important institutional changes
in the financial system. On the one hand, it has fostered disintermediation, i.e., the
tendency of borrowers to access capital markets directly rather than through the use
of a bank. On the other hand, non-bank financial institutions have ventured into
business areas traditionally reserved for commercial banks. Responding to the
resulting loss of traditional business, banks have become the dominant players in the
derivatives markets (see above). Corresponding to the greater substitutability of
financial assets, then, institutional differences have become more blurred. The
emergence of large financial conglomerates in Europe over the last decade points in
the same direction.
One important question regarding the economic function of derivatives is, do17 Board et al. (1995) refer to the Bank of England and Stock Exchange reports on this issue.
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they contribute to the stabilization or destabilization of financial markets. The answer
has several aspects. One is that the unbundling of different types of risk attached to
an underlying asset and the creation of separate markets for each of them implies that
there are now more prices to consider. Creating a price for a specific type of risk
means that news regarding this particular type have a larger impact on this particular
price, but a smaller one on other prices, it is thus both stabilizing and destabilizing.
Furthermore, the increased liquidity of asset markets and the greater substitutability of
financial assets lead to stronger links between individual markets and more efficient
shock absorption. From this perspective, derivatives should reduce market volatility.
A related point is that greater arbitrage possibilities between forward and spot markets
should facilitate the incorporation of new information into spot market prices, making
the reaction of the latter to unexpected market developments less disruptive. This is
supported by the observation that forward market prices typically “lead” spot prices
over time (Board et al., 1995). 
At the same time, derivatives allow traders to take speculative positions with
greater financial leverage, since they can buy and sell risks without having to acquire
or sell the underlying assets. Traders can react faster and with larger trading volumes
to news and shocks affecting asset price expectations, and engage in more complex
investment strategies that may exacerbate excess demands or excess supplies of
assets in times of turbulence (BIS, 1994). As a result, even small shocks can trigger
large changes in asset holdings. In this sense, the development of derivatives markets
can destabilize markets.
Empirical evidence suggests that the emergence of derivatives markets has not
caused additional volatility in spot markets (IMF, 1997; Cohen, 1996; Board et al.,
1995). In fact, official reports on the 1987 crash indicate that the low volume of
derivatives trade slowed down the recovery from the crash
17. However, the BIS (1994)
suggests that trading in derivative markets may occasionally have had destabilizing
effects on the underlying securities markets during periods of unusual stress, as some21
trading strategies may amplify excess supplies of assets in times of falling prices. The
US General Accounting Office (GAO, 1994) argues that the increased links across
markets and the concentration on a small number of traders increases the risk of
“chain events”, i.e., crises that spread from one market to another. The main concern
is the potential effect of a sudden withdrawal of one large trader from the market,
which could suddenly make the market very illiquid. To avoid destabilizing effects of
derivative-based, automated trading strategies, exchanges today have implemented
circuit breakers that stop trading in the case of sudden, large price movements.
Kambhu et al. (1996) report from simulation exercises that price shocks cause less
volatility in OTC derivatives markets than in securities markets.
IV. Monetary Policy Consequences of Derivatives
Section II has illustrated the rapid growth of the new financial instruments.
Section III has reviewed their economic functions and interpreted them in terms of the
emergence of a more perfect financial market system. What does this imply for the
effectiveness and conduct of monetary policy? We develop an answer  to this question
in two steps. First, we consider the implications of derivatives for the design of
monetary strategies, given the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Next, we
discuss their implications for the monetary transmission mechanism. This corresponds
approximately to a distinction between medium run and long run effects. Naturally, the
longer-run considerations are more speculative. To lay out a long-run scenario, we will
assume that the growth of financial derivatives markets will continue and eventually
create a much more perfect financial system. 
IV.1. Implications for Monetary Strategies
For a given monetary transmission mechanism and a given set of goals, the
design of a monetary strategy is a set of rules regarding instrument choice and the22
reaction to current events enabling the central bank to best reach its objectives. Since
the link between monetary policy actions and  target variables - the price level, output
and employment - are “long and variable” (Friedman, 1968) strategy design involves
the choice of an intermediate target variable serving as a link between the two. An
intermediate target strategy focuses on how the intermediate target should be
controled over a medium-run time horizon, during which the target variables
themselves cannot be or can only imperfectly be observed. 
A first implication of a more complete financial market for any monetary strategy
is  the availability of a broader range of observable asset prices conveying information
about the current and expected state of the economy. In addition to inflation, interest
rate and exchange rate expectations contained in interest rates and futures prices,
derivatives prices in particular contain new types of information a central bank can use
to improve its monetary strategy. For example, the Black-Scholes (1973) model of
option pricing implies that market expectations about asset price volatility can be
extracted from options prices (Söderlind and Svensson, 1997). Furthermore,
comparing call and put prices and volumes yields information about market
expectations of changes in the prices of the underlying assets and their volatility. At a
general level, the emergence of derivatives markets can help central banks to get a
more complete picture of market sentiments and, thus, the market environment they
operate in (BIS, 1994). 
The discussion of the choice of an intermediate target focuses on the source of
the dominant shocks in an economy and the stability of the link between the
intermediate and the ultimate targets of monetary policy. The first issue was raised by
Poole (1970) who argues that a central bank should choose “the” interest rate (more
generally, an asset price), if the dominant shocks arise from the financial sector
(shocks to the money demand function), and a monetary aggregate, if the dominant
shocks arise from the real sector.
One important, traditional argument in this debate is that the emergence of new23
financial instruments can be interpreted as a source of instability of the money
demand function. As new financial instruments are being developed, the public’s
demand for money changes, and this in a way that is often difficult to predict with any
reasonable degree of precision. In a period of rapid development of derivatives
markets, central banks should, therefore, give preference to asset prices over
monetary aggregates as intermediate targets. But the argument has less strength than
it looks at a first glance. On the one hand, the preference for asset prices is only a
transitional one. On the other hand, the introduction of financial instruments allowing
the stabilization of cash flows and the reduction of exposure to interest rate shocks
should affect an economy’s investment demand function as much as its money
demand function. If so, the net effect on the desirability of asset prices as intermediate
targets is unclear. 
In the longer run, the emergence of a more complete asset market contradicts
the assumption, central to Poole’s analysis, that the economy has only “one” interest
rate. More generally, a reliable interest rate target then requires that the central bank
can target an interest rate index representing the whole range of interest rates over
the yield curve. In this regard, the implications of a more perfect financial environment
are ambiguous. Monetary policy necessarily operates on the short end of the yield
curve. The transmission of monetary impulses from the short to the long end depends
on how changes in inflation expectations triggered by monetary policy actions
translate into changes in long-term interest rates. On the one hand, the availability of
a broader range of arbitrage opportunities suggests that expectations effects “travel
faster” along the yield curve (see e.g. Vrolijk, 1997 and Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994).
This results in a more rapid adjustment of financial asset prices to monetary shocks.
It is usually argued that this effect is of minor importance, as the speed of financial
market adjustment is already high (Issing and Bischofberger, 1996). However, for less
liquid assets like mortgages and bank loans price adjustment might be significantly
increased. 
On the other hand, the greater substitutability among financial assets and the18 The alternative mechanism how sterilized interventions can affect exchange rates is if they are
understood by the market as credible signals about future central bank actions (Mussa, 1986). In this context, a
the emergence of a more complete financial market system has no clear implications for their effectiveness.
24
more efficient price system suggest that long term rates are more strongly affected by
expectations (and information) from other sectors of the economy. With a greater
information set underlying the inflation expectations in long-term interest rates, a given
monetary impulse will have a smaller effect on these rates. Hentschel and Smith
(1997) argue that the greater information set available should help agents to
distinguish between real and monetary shocks, thus reducing the real effects of
monetary policy.
Exchange rate policies, the other version of a monetary strategy based on asset
prices, are more strongly affected by the emergence of more complete asset markets.
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, many central banks,
particularly among the G7 reverted to “sterilized interventions” to combine a monetary
strategy geared at domestic policy goals with an exchange rate target. Sterilized
interventions, in which the liquidity effect of the central bank’s foreign exchange
market operations is immediately offset by counteracting operations in the domestic
money market and which therefore change the relative supply of domestic and foreign
financial assets without changing the money supply, can only affect the exchange rate,
if domestic and foreign financial assets are imperfect substitutes. From this
perspective, the emergence of a more perfect financial market system should
decrease the effectiveness of sterilized interventions.
18 
International finance speaks of the “unholy trinity” to describe the inconsistency
of a  combination of high international capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and a
monetary policy geared at domestic policy goals. With high capital mobility, fixed
exchange rates become highly exposed to speculative attacks, leaving the central
bank no room for a policy that might raise even slight doubts about the sustainability
of the exchange rate target. Thus, national monetary authorities have no choice but
either to completely subdue monetary policy to the exchange rate target, and, hence,
accept the rate of inflation of the currency they peg to and the loss of monetary policy19 This could be avoided if the central bank closes its derivatives position by an appropriate operation in
the spot market. This however, makes the operation equivalent to a sterilized intervention (e.g. BIS, 1994). 
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as a tool to stabilize the domestic economy, or to renounce the exchange rate target.
The experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1992/93, when the system
collapsed after a period of mounting imbalances between national monetary policy
goals and the requirements of the fixed rate, has forcefully demonstrated this point
(von Hagen, 1996). Eichengreen et al. (1998) point to the potential role played by
specific institutional investors (hedge funds) and, hence, their position taking using
derivatives contracts during the 1992/93 EMS and the recent Asian currency and
financial crises. They do not, however, find any  strong evidence for the hypothesis
that hedge funds precipitate such crises either directly through the sheer size of their
positions or indirectly via herding behavior of other market participants.
One might, of course, turn the argument around and suggest that central banks
themselves could make use of derivative instruments rather than outright purchases
and sales in the spot market to stabilize exchange rates. While this is possible in
theory, and central banks have occasionally used forward market interventions, central
banks would then take speculative positions in the same way private speculators do.
19
One may argue that this is an efficient way of sending credible signals about future
central bank intentions - after all, the central bank should not speculate against its own
future actions. But, if the spot rate later moves in the wrong direction the central bank
would take large losses and be accused in public as engaging in unprofitable, and
unpopular speculative activities. If, in contrast, the central bank made large profits on
speculative positions, other market participants would accuse it of using its own power
to manipulate spot prices in order to make its own bet come true at the cost of private
market participants. Institutions of public policy like central banks fear such
accusations too much to make the use of derivatives on a large scale attractive to
central banks.
Thus, the rapid development of derivatives markets has likely strengthened the
logic and force of the “unholy trinity”. Increased liquidity of financial markets and26
increased leverage of financial positions imply that speculators can attack
unsustainable fixed exchange rates even faster and more powerfully than before. The
rapid innovation of new financial instruments in these markets also implies the futility
of attempts to “throw sand in the wheels” through regulation or the introduction of a
“Tobin tax” on speculative transactions (Salvatore, 1997). As a result, the new
financial environment has increased the vulnerability of fixed exchange rate systems.
As the European example teaches, one way out of this dilemma is to move to a
full-fledged monetary union. But the European Monetary Union will remain the
exception on the international scene as it requires the political willingness to accept
the loss of national sovereignty in a broad range of policies. The example of Argentina
in recent years teaches that the other solution is a currency board, i.e., to give up
monetary policy independence completely and to accept the possibility of domestic
recessions in times of large capital flows out of the economy even if these are entirely
due to economic events abroad, such as the “Tequila crisis” in 1994/95. Since this
solution, again, is politically unattractive for most countries, the likely consequence of
the development of derivatives markets is a strong decline in the interest countries
take in fixed exchange rates as a monetary strategy. 
Turning to monetary aggregates, a first point is that the increased
substitutability of financial assets and the increased liquidity provided by derivatives
makes the definition of “money”, particularly of broad monetary aggregates
increasingly difficult (Savona and Maccario, 1997). Simple-sum monetary aggregates
are based on the assumption that their components are perfect substitutes and that
the aggregate as a whole has only a very low degree of substitutability with other
financial assets. This may remain true for cash and pure transactions accounts (more
on this below), but it is increasingly questionable for time deposits, savings deposits,
certificates of deposit. The standard response of central banks, to broaden the simple-
sum aggregate used as intermediate target,  is clearly inappropriate, as it disregards
anything between perfect and very low substitutability. Furthermore, the broader the
aggregate, the more a monetary target becomes equivalent to targeting the entire27
balance sheet of the banking sector, with little hope for sufficient controllability of the
intermediate target. 
The more sophisticated response, coming from aggregation theory, is to
construct monetary Divisia indices (Barnett, 1978, 1980). By construction, Divisia
indices incorporate different degrees of substitution among financial assets by
incorporating relative prices. Empirical evidence has shown that Divisia indices do
indeed yield superior measures of the money supply than broad simple-sum
aggregates (Mullineux, 1996). Yet, they are unsatisfactory as intermediate targets,
because they are difficult to explain to the public, making it hard to communicate
central bank policy intentions to the public, because the theory of the money supply
underlying the Divisia approach is not well developed, and because targeting Divisia
indices requires a forecast of the effect of monetary policy actions on relative asset
prices, which remains exceedingly difficult.
The essence of this discussion then is a preference for narrow simple-sum
monetary aggregates, which remain valid even under Divisia aggregation. Since such
aggregates are notoriously more volatile in the short run than in the long run, this
preference implies a shift to monetary targets over longer time horizons (two or more
years) and with it a stronger focus of monetary policy on the trend growth of money
rather than a reaction of monetary policy to short run fluctuations in other economic
variables (von Hagen, 1997). Hentschel and Smith (1997) argue that use of
derivatives should reduce demand for excess reserves by improving bank´s liquidity
risk management. This, in turn, should also reduce the volatility of the money
multiplier, which would increase the central bank´s effective control over narrow
monetary aggregates.
More recently, the debate over monetary policy strategies has contrasted
monetary targets and inflation targets. While monetary targets can be, and in practice
have been, combined with a target for the rate of inflation (von Hagen, 1995), the
substantive difference between the two approaches is in the choice of the intermediate28
target. Specifically, inflation targeting involves the use of an inflation forecast as
intermediate target, using a much broader range of variables as inputs than just a
monetary target. Thus, Svensson (1996) speaks about “inflation forecast targeting”.
But since there is nothing in the concept of monetary targeting preventing the central
bank from using all available information to update its monetary target and interpret
deviations from it, the mere scope of information variables yields no convincing
argument in favor of inflation forecast targeting (von Hagen, 1997). This is confirmed
by the observation that, on the basis of the central bank’s reactions to current events,
there are hardly any differences between the two (Mishkin and Posen, 1997).
Similarly, the fact that inflation forecasts in practice use a host of economic
relationships from labor and output markets in addition to financial sector relations to
predict inflation yields no apriori grounds, except under very narrow assumptions
about the stochastic nature of the shocks, for the assumption that such forecasts be
less vulnerable to structural shifts in the process of financial innovation than the
relations required to derive a monetary target. 
IV.2. Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy
Does the existence of a more complete financial market system as provided by
the emergence of financial derivatives change the effectiveness of monetary policy?
With this question we turn to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Answers
to this question obviously depend on the underlying theory of the monetary
transmission mechanism itself.
A first answer, and one that remains within the scope of the traditional IS-LM
paradigm, starts by recognizing that financial derivatives allow their users, businesses
and households, to obtain insurance against interest rate and exchange rate shocks.
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Froot et al. (1993), among others, show why firms should
use derivatives as part of their risk management strategies. To the extent that
monetary policy actions are a source of interest rate and exchange rate shocks, the20 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) estimate that federal funds rate shocks in the US generally peter out after
six to nine months.
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widespread use of financial derivatives should reduce their immediate impact on
investment decisions and, hence, on aggregate demand. However, the finite maturity
of all financial derivatives implies that the user cannot shield himself against interest
rate or exchange rate changes forever (Hausler, 1996). Thus, monetary policy actions
will have an effect sooner or later (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1994; Issing and
Bischofberger, 1996).  But this conclusion is weaker than it may first seem.
Empirically, changes in central bank interest rates are themselves rarely of a
permanent nature.
20 Furthermore, in an international environment firms can use
financial derivatives to trade domestic for foreign interest rate risk. The possibility that
domestic and foreign interest rate shocks offset each other then implies a reduced
effect of domestic interest rate shocks on domestic investment decisions. In sum,
under the IS-LM paradigm one should conclude that the power of monetary policy to
affect aggregate demand is eroded by the emergence of a more perfect financial
market system. 
The IS-LM paradigm, however, has long come under attack, since it does not fit
well with empirical evidence of  how monetary policy affects the economy: The timing
and size of the reactions of the real economy to changes in central bank interest rates
are too different from what this paradigm predicts (Mishkin, 1995; Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995). To get a more convincing explanation of the transmission mechanism,
the picture must be broadened. 
The credit-market view of monetary policy transmission (Bernanke, 1993;
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995) does this by introducing credit market imperfections while
maintaining the general macro economic framework of the Keynesian system. Refuting
the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem, it argues that internal and external
finance are imperfect substitutes and that firms rely critically on external funding to
finance investment projects. Among the sources of external funding, bank loans are
imperfect substitutes for corporate securities, and there is a class of borrowers in the21 Proponents of the credit market view have so far been more interested in empirical research than in
developing a model of general macroeconomic equilibrium incorporating their arguments. Although the
underlying model is usually claimed to be of a three-asset type (money, bonds, and bank credit), the interaction
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economy, e.g., small businesses, that are constrained to bank loans as the only
source of borrowing. When interest rates rise in the economy, banks face an outflow
of short-term deposits, which cannot be easily substituted for by issuing certificates of
deposits or other sources of funds. Under such circumstances, banks prefer to invest
in marketable securities rather than bank loans, as the former are more liquid and less
risky than the latter. Thus, the supply of bank credit decreases, and borrowers
constrained to this source of funding cut their investment expenditures, leading to a
decline in aggregate demand. Another version of the credit market view  holds that
businesses relying on bank loans as the only source of funding face credit constraints
that depend on the value of their marketable collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). As
interest rates rise, the value of collateral declines and with it the availability of credit.
Again, aggregate demand falls by more than the rise in interest rates would suggest in
itself.
Since the emergence of financial derivatives provides a more complete market
system, one should expect that it reduces the importance of transmission channels
relying on market imperfections (Issing and Bischofberger, 1996). Specifically, the
possibility to trade variable for fixed interest rate payments and to hedge against
fluctuations in asset prices should protect businesses against variations of their
creditworthiness due to variations in short term interest rates (e.g. Titman, 1992).
Furthermore, the increased liquidity of bank loans provided by derivatives increases
the substitutability between these and other forms of credit and, therefore, reduces the
strength of the mechanism. Thus, the use of derivatives should reduce the effect of
changes in central bank interest rates  to the pure IS-LM effect which, as suggested by
empirical evidence on the interest elasticity of investment demand, would be rather
small.
The credit view still remains within the boundaries of the IS-LM paradigm as the
general macro economic framework.
21 A central tenet of this paradigm is that theof these markets is not analyzed. This is in contrast to the earlier literature led by Brunner and Meltzer, where the
bank loan market was at the heart of the analysis.
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financial markets of an economy can be usefully summarized in a two-assets structure
in which “money” is a substitute only for “bonds”, implying that all non-monetary assets
are perfect substitutes, and “the” interest rate is the only relative price in the financial
system. A change in the money supply then has a straightforward impact on this
interest rate, which, in turn, affects aggregate demand. The more complete a financial
market system, the less this is a tenable view of the economy. The monetarist critique
of the IS-LM framework in the 1960s and 1970s already demonstrated that, even
considering no more than three financial assets, money, bonds, and equity, and,
hence, two asset prices raises the complexity of the analysis considerably and makes
predictions of the effects of monetary policy actions on aggregate demand more
demanding (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Brunner and Meltzer, 1976; Meltzer, 1995).
The more assets there are, the more information such predictions need on the degrees
of substitutability between money and other assets, which themselves may change
over time. This, of course, reinforces our observation about the consequences of
financial innovations for the measurement of money. Here, the point goes deeper,
however. In a more perfect financial system, the transmission of monetary impulses to
the real sector becomes increasingly complex and hard to forecast, too.
In a more complete financial market system, then, central banks find it harder to
predict the effect of a given monetary impulse on real output and employment with any
reasonable precision. While it remains true that a monetary expansion ultimately
raises the price level, its short-run real effect is much more difficult to determine. Thus,
discretionary monetary policies aiming at moving output and employment closer to
some target levels become more uncertain. The important policy implication is that
central banks operating in a more complete financial environment should refrain from
active monetary stabilization of short-run real fluctuations and focus on the more long-
run goal of price stability instead. Thus, the emergence of financial derivatives
“disciplines” monetary policy in the sense of inducing a shift of the policy makers’
attention to low inflation.    22 As Fama (1980) points out, deposits might alternatively have a fixed price in terms of the unit of
account and a variable interest rate.
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IV.3. Non-Monetary Payment Systems
The extension of the analytical framework discussed above still follows the
traditional paradigm of monetary economics in assuming that money, and money
alone, is the economy’s  general medium of transaction and unit of account. Banks
play a special role in monetary economics, because, by definition, their liabilities are
“money” (Tobin, 1963). Proponents of the “New Monetary Economics” (Cowen and
Kroszner, 1987) have long pointed out that this assumption is by no means a natural
one: Payment technologies can be conceptualized that are based on the exchange of
financial assets other than money, and where the medium of exchange does not
coincide with the unit of account (Fama, 1980, 1983). Wallace (1983) argues that the
special role of money and, hence, monetary policy is due entirely to legal restrictions,
making money artificially the only unit of account.  
New Monetary Economics takes an economy with an unregulated, competitive
banking system as its paradigm (Black, 1970; Fama, 1980; Hall, 1983). Competitive
banks offer transaction services and manage portfolios of interest bearing, risky
assets. Bank accounts are shares in such portfolios, pay competitive interest rates and
have variable prices in terms of the economy’s unit of account.
22 Depending on the
depositor’s preferences, banks offer accounts of different interest-rate risk
combinations. Obviously, there is little special about such transaction accounts as
financial assets. Transactions from them are merely transfers of assets from the
payer’s account to the recipient’s account. Since they provide an extra service, banks
charge a competitive fee for them. Apart from that, an arbitrage-free equilibrium
demands that such accounts pay the same interest rate than any other asset of the
same risk-return characteristic. 
In the purest form of such a system, there is no need for a special asset to serve33
as a generalized medium of payment. Hence, the transactions accounts create no
need for a bank to hold reserves - voluntary or required - of such a medium against
them. This is the main  difference compared to the traditional monetary economy,
where payments are settled in a medium provided by the central bank (central bank
reserves and currency) and where the amount of reserves and currency made
available by the central bank - or their price as determined by the central bank - puts
a limit on the banking sector’s ability or willingness to make loans and create deposits,
the cornerstone of monetary policy. The implication is that the aggregate volume of
these accounts is determined entirely by the private sector’s demand (Fama, 1980;
Fischer, 1987). As Greenfield and Yeager (1983) put it: “No longer, then, could there
be to much of it [of central bank money in a regulated economy], causing price
inflation, or too little, causing depression, or a sequence of imbalances, causing
stagflation. A wrong quantity of money could no longer cause problems...”. Thus, there
is no role for government policy trying to affect output and employment in such an
economy.
The discussion of the economic functions of derivatives suggests that the
development of a more complete financial system can take the modern economy a big
step towards such a system. A first reason for this is that derivatives allow to
circumvent existing legal restrictions in financial markets, making regulations less
binding. A second reason relates to the demand for  transactions accounts of the type
envisioned by New Monetary Economics, i.e., variable-price shares in financial
portfolios. One important reason why transactions accounts with variable prices have
not been widely used in the past even after two decades of financial regulation is
probably that private households and firms value planning certainty for their daily
transactions. A high degree of certainty about the purchasing power available in a
transactions account reduces information and transactions cost. Obviously, this
demand for certainty relates much more to the short run than the long run. In this
regard, the development of financial instruments allowing banks to offer transactions
accounts based on interest-bearing assets with low short-run volatility should make
such accounts much more attractive as an alternative to traditional, fixed-price34
deposits.  One should expect, therefore, that such accounts would become
increasingly popular as the development of derivatives markets continues, particularly
since financial deregulation increases competition in the banking industry. The decline
of the traditional banking industry in the US and elsewhere as a result of competitive
pressures over the past decade, accompanied by a decreasing importance of
traditional bank deposits as a source of funding and an increasing role of banks in the
derivatives markets (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995) clearly supports that expectation. 
A third reason for the demise of central bank money as medium of transaction
relates again to the supply side. For a given stock of fixed-price transactions accounts,
the increased liquidity of non-monetary assets provided by financial derivatives allows
banks to improve the efficiency of their reserves management. That is, central bank
money can be substituted against interest-bearing assets as liquid reserves. While the
banks’ demand for reserves will not disappear completely, the likely consequence is
that the amount of central bank money the central bank supplies to the banking
industry, or the price of central bank money set by the central bank, will lose
importance as a parameter determining the amount of loans banks are willing to
extend and the interest rates they charge. This would reduce the power of monetary
policy to control the volume of money and credit. Obviously, the extent of this
substitution process depends on the conduct of monetary policy itself, since the choice
between central bank money and other liquid reserve assets is an endogenous one.
On the one hand, the  greater availability of alternative reserve assets is likely to put
pressure on central banks to provide better quality services to the banking industry.
More relevant for monetary policy, however, is the consideration that frequent and
unexpected changes in a central bank’s lending conditions to commercial banks will
reduce the attractiveness of central bank money as a reserve asset compared to other
alternatives. Thus, the less steady and transparent central bank behavior, the more
central bank money will lose importance as a reserve asset and the more the central
bank will lose control over the supply of money. 
  One might argue that central banks can prevent that from happening by setting23 The importance of the government’s power to tax as a basis for the demand for government-issued
money is discussed extensively in Goodhart (1997). 
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sufficiently high required reserve rates and by extending the coverage of reserve
requirements to a broader range of bank liabilities, beyond fixed-price deposits. Fama
(1980), for example, shows how the central bank can create a demand for money by
imposing a reserve requirement in terms of central bank money on a completely non-
monetary asset serving as medium of transaction. However, in a world of high
international capital mobility, reserve requirements create international competitive
disadvantages for a national banking industry. Competition for market shares in the
international financial markets results in pressures on central banks to reduce reserve
requirements to avoid hurting their national banking industries. There is a close
resemblance in this situation to international competition in capital taxation: high
capital mobility puts strong downward pressure on reserve requirements. The
reduction of required reserve ratios in recent years, even in countries where the
central bank traditionally regards  reserve requirements as indispensable for monetary
policy, like Germany, indicates the force of this competition. 
Despite these tendencies to replace money by other means of transaction,
however, the demand for government-issued money will not disappear completely, as
envisioned by the proponents of New Monetary Economics. One reason is quite simply
that governments themselves can secure a demand for the money they issue by
insisting that all tax payments be made using it.
23 As long as governments uphold this
requirement, central bank money will remain in use, and, given the size of the modern
state in the economy, will create a sizeable demand for money as medium of
transaction in transactions with the government. As taxation pervades all sectors of the
economy, the demand should remain a function of aggregate real income and real
wealth, although it will likely be much less interest elastic and much more seasonal
than money demand is traditionally. Even where all transactions among private agents
were executed without using central bank money, banks would still hold some reserves
of central bank money to serve their customers’ demand for executing transactions
with the government. 24 See Rogoff (1998) for a theory of the demand for cash based on informal exchanges.
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Furthermore, a demand for government-issued cash as a medium of transaction
in very small denominations will remain. New Monetary Economics focuses entirely on
payments from bank accounts and disregards the fact that economic agents execute
small payments in their daily shopping activities.  The desire to make informal, non-
market exchanges of a medium of transaction (gifts and payments in the shadow
economy) contributes further to this demand for cash.
24  
Nevertheless, even with these qualifications it is plausible to expect that the
demand for government-issued money will decline substantially as banks develop
more attractive types of transactions accounts. The degree to which new media of
transaction will replace money is ultimately an endogenous variable. Taking the
unregulated financial system and a fully demand-determined supply of the quantity of
transactions accounts as the reference point suggests that it will depend largely on the
central bank’s behavior in controlling the supply of money. The more frequently the
central bank exploits its role as provider of a medium of transaction to actively
constrain the business of financial institutions in pursuit of discretionary macro
economic management, the more these institutions will be induced to seek alternative
means of payment and offer them to the non-bank public. Similarly, uncertainty about
central bank actions constraining financial institutions will induce banks to substitute
out of money as a medium of transaction. From this perspective, the emergence of a
more perfect financial market system induces central banks to refrain from short-run
oriented, macro economic activism in favor of a more long-run oriented, predictable
monetary policy. 
Expecting the role of monetary policy in controlling aggregate demand to
diminish is, obviously, not the same as expecting that aggregate demand will no longer
be exposed to shocks originating in the financial sector. Here, we disagree with the
proponents of New Monetary Economics, who claim that, in an unregulated financial
environment, financial institutions will not be able to actively create credit, and, hence,
macro economic fluctuations caused by an excess supply of (demand for) credit which25 It is worth noting in this context that the introduction of European Monetary Union as currently
planned introduces a separation of the unit of account and the (dominant) medium of transaction. Specifically, the
Euro will be the sole medium of transaction in wholesale financial transactions immediately upon the start of
EMU, while the national currency units will remain units of account in retail business for the first few years. 
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must be met by an excess demand for (supply of) goods cannot arise (Black, 1970;
Tobin, 1963). As Krüger (1997) shows, this view mistakes an unregulated economy to
be necessarily one of perfect information. As long as information asymmetries prevail
between lenders and borrowers, and information advantages make banks “local”
monopolists in their loan relationships, the potential for credit creation, hence macro
economic fluctuations remains. Nevertheless, the declining role of money as the
general medium of transaction implies a declining role of  monetary policy as an
independent source of such fluctuations and as a policy tool to combat them. Whether
macro economic fluctuations will, in the end, be more or less pronounced than in a
traditional monetary economy remains an empirical question. 
The possible emergence of a financial system where central bank money largely
loses its role as medium of transaction raises the question, discussed in the New
Monetary Economics,  of what will be the unit of account in such an economy. As
pointed out by Fama (1980), there is nothing that requires an economy’s medium of
transaction to coincide with its unit of account.
25  While competition and market forces
can drive the economy towards using more efficient transactions technologies, the
choice of a unit of account is a matter that markets cannot solve easily. A unit of
account is an important element of communication among market participants, and its
attractiveness for an indivual economic agent depends on how many other agents use
the same unit of account. Thus, the choice involves important economies of scale and
network externalities. Empirical evidence suggests that economies switch from one
unit of account to another only in times of hyperinflation, when the value of this unit is
uncertain and eroding rapidly. Hysteresis thus plays a large role in answering the
question. A suggestive answer then is that government-issued money would retain its
role as unit of account even in economies where it no longer serves as the dominant
medium of transaction, as long as central banks secure its stable value in terms of
goods and services. 26 See Cowen and Krozner (1994). Woodford (1997) shows that the central bank can control inflation
even if the demand for central bank money tends to zero in the limit.
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In sum, we have argued that the development of a more perfect financial market
system bears important consequences for monetary policy and its role in the economy.
It allows banks to offer shares in interest-bearing asset portfolios as transactions
accounts with relatively little short-run price volatility. Central bank money will remain
the medium of transaction with the government and retain its unit of account function,
but monetary policy will lose its power to affect the real side of the economy by actively
restraining the amount of loans banks are willing to extend. By itself, this should
induce central banks to shift attention away from trying to achieve short-run oriented
goals of output and employment stabilization and from short-run oriented,
discretionary activism. As central banks will realize that the banking sector’s choice
between central bank money and other, highly liquid reserve assets depends critically
on the stability of the central bank’s lending conditions, and that the public’s use of
central bank money as unit of account depends critically on the stability of its value,
this tendency for monetary policy to adhere to monetary policy rules and focus on the
long-run goal of monetary policy, price stability, will be reinforced. 
Note that, even if monetary policy loses its power to affect output and
employment in the short run, price stability remains a reasonable goal of monetary
policy 
26. Since the demand for money remains well-defined, a positive price of money
in terms of other goods exists. Monetary policy will then have to combine a high
degree of elasticity of the money supply to accomodate seasonal variations in the
demand for money in the short run with a long-run money growth trend that follows the
trend growth rate of aggregate output. Going back to previous arguments, a monetary
strategy of multi-annual targets for narrow monetary aggregates would be an
appropriate strategy to achieve that. 
The demise of short-run, macro economic stabilization as a monetary policy
objective contributes to the declining importance of exchange rate considerations in
monetary policy. This, in turn, will make central banks less interested in international27 Congressional Record 18 June 1993, H 3322.
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policy coordination, as the benefit from policy coordination comes mainly from the
international spill-overs of monetary surprises generated by central banks in response
to aggregate demand and supply shocks (e.g. Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991). This
tendency will be reinforced by the fact that in a more complex financial markets
environment the design of optimally coordinated central bank strategies becomes
increasingly difficult.
V. Regulatory Policies 
The rapid emergence of derivatives markets has raised fears about their
potential damaging effect on the stability of the financial sector, exemplified by the
statement of Henry Gonzalez, chairman of the Banking Committee of the US House of
Representatives: “I have long believed that growing bank involvement in derivatives
trade is, as I say and repeat, like a tinderbox waiting to explode.”
27  Likewise, the GAO
(1994) report concludes that there was some reason to believe that derivatives created
a threat to the financial system and that additional regulation was required, although
the GAO saw the increasing activities of unregulated non-bank financial institutions in
these markets as the main reason to worry (Bothwell, 1994). In contrast, Greenspan
(1994a) warns that increasing regulation might create the false impression that federal
regulation would remove all risk, inducing private agents to engage in ever riskier
activities. Similarly, Goodhart et al. (1997) warn that regulation would be excessive
and overly expensive if it tried to reduce the risk facing small investors and consumers
to unduly low levels. The Group of 30 (1997) insists that, while it is not sensible to
eliminate all risk, the risk of large disruptions of the financial system as a whole should
be eliminated through regulatory initiatives. 
Apart from the sheer size of the new markets (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995), two
factors are behind these fears, the fact that they allow to take speculative positions
with greater leverage and more complex strategies, and the fact that, since derivative28 Even the Barings crisis, after all, did not result in problems regarded as systemic.
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positions are not visible in the balance sheets of financial institutions and because
they often span across international borders, monitoring the riskiness of financial
institutions becomes more difficult. The existing empirical evidence suggests that the
first factor may be a valid concern for individual financial institutions engaging in
excessively risky activities (witness the Barings crisis), but not so for the financial
system as a whole, since the net exposure of the banking system to credit risks
stemming from derivatives trade is rather small (IMF, 1996a; Edwards and Mishkin
1995; Kambhu et al, 1996).
28 Recognition of the second factor has triggered a
discussion about changes in the regulatory approach of bank regulators.  
Traditional, corporatist arrangements for banking regulation have emphasized
restricted market access, limited competition and the imposition of regulatory
standards based on financial accounting, balance sheets and income statements
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993). These arrangements relied heavily on a strict
institutional separation of different types of financial activities, such as commercial
banking, real estate finance, insurance, etc. This separation was reflected in a division
of regulatory responsibilities among different regulatory bodies, each concerned with
one particulat financial industry. With restricted market access and competition,
regulatory functions could often be implemented on the basis of semi-private industry
arrangements or in cooperation between industry organizations and government
agencies rather than direct government intervention. 
Financial innovation and the emergence of a more perfect financial system have
eroded  the borders between different markets and spurred more intense competition,
including international competition, among financial institutions. Corporatist
arrangements become much more difficult to maintain in such an environment,
because competition tends to destroy the traditional, insider-club nature of industry
relations, and because the branching out of financial institutions into new markets has
created a more fuzzy industry structure than the traditional one. At the same time, the
use of derivatives and other innovations has facilitated the circumvention of barriers to29 We ignore some secondary reasons related to the smoothness of the money supply process and credit
allocation schemes driven by social policy goals.
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market entry and limits to competition. The traditional arrangements have, therefore,
both lost effectiveness in constraining management behavior and created
inefficiencies as the same financial activities came to fall under different regulatory
jurisdictions and regulatory bodies are notoriously bad in cooperating with each other
(Goodhart, 1996a, Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993). Regulatory responses to these
challenges include a shift towards more market-friendly modes of regulation, the
consolidation of regulatory functions, and attempts at international cooperation
(Padoa-Schioppa, 1995).
V.1. Motivations for Banking Regulation
There are three basic reasons why financial institutions are regulated 
29, each
leading to different modes and instruments of regulation. The first is the protection of
(small) depositors against the risk of bank failure (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). It is
motivated by the observation that small depositors find it hard and excessively costly
to monitor the lending activities of their banks, and are therefore unable to prevent
banks from pursuing too risky lending strategies.  While banks can, in principle, offer
to insure their deposits to solve this problem, information asymmetries between the
insurer and the bank make it impossible to price deposit risk in an actuarially fair way,
and mispricing risk induces moral hazard on the part of the insured (e.g., Chan,
Greenbaum, and Thakor, 1992). Where it exists, deposit insurance is, therefore,
commonly compulsory and provided by the government which uses further regulatory
tools to address the moral hazard problems created by the insurance. 
The second reason for financial regulation is to prevent financial contagion, i.e.,
the spill over effects large withdrawals of deposits at one bank may have on the
banking industry. The mismatch in maturities between bank assets and liabilities
creates the risk that depositors run to withdraw their funds from a bank in the event of30 See Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) and Hartmann (1994) for a review of these issues.
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even  a slight suspicion that the bank be unable to repay its liabilities (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983). As each depositor wants to be first in line to obtain his deposit before
the bank has used up its liquid reserves, bank runs are of a self-propelling nature. If
depositors at other banks read the closing of one bank as a signal that their banks are
equally in financial trouble, the run can spread to other banks.  Regulatory strategies
to prevent bank runs involve measures to convince depositors of the financial
soundness of the banking sector, such as, prudential rules limiting the risk exposure of
the banks and forcing them to hold reserves sufficient to meet sudden increases in the
demand for cash. Furthermore, bank panics can be prevented by a credible lender of
last resort. If depositors are assured that banks can obtain the reserves to pay out
their deposits, the value of being first in line disappears and bank panics do not arise.
The third reason for financial regulation is to preserve the integrity of payments
mechanisms.
30  Payments systems can help economize on central bank money and
avoid long delays in payments if they limit actual settlement between the participants
to the net positions at the end of a specified settlement period. In doing so, they create
credit relations among the participants during the time interval between the initiation
and the final settlement of all payments. In contrast to a bank’s ordinary lending
business, a  payments system makes banks extend credit to other banks as a result of
the business activities of the latter, without choice nor assessment of their counterparts
(Angelini and Passacantando, 1992; Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993). If a
participant proves unable to meet its obligations, all other participants may be affected
as they are interconnected in a cobweb of credit relations. The system would then
have to grind to a halt and all payments be unwound to isolate the failing institution
from the other participants, a procedure that would be lengthy, costly, and often
impossible. In an international context, this liquidity risk is augmented by “Herstatt
risk”, the settlement risk resulting from the fact that national payment systems in
different countries may not be open during the same hours of a day.  The smooth
operation of payments systems can be assured by an agent who guarantees the43
execution of all payments initiated during a settlement period, another lender-of-last-
resort function. Regulatory provisions surrounding this function focus on the quality of
a bank’s risk controls, computing and back-up facilities and network technologies
(Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1993).
Among the three modes of banking regulation, the first is akin to consumer
protection, i.e., it focuses on the need of uninformed customers to be protected against
fraudulent business practices. The latter two address systemic issues; i.e. spill-overs
of the activities of one bank to other banks or the payment system. Although there is a
large degree of variation across countries in this regard (von Hagen, 1997), central
banks are typically charged with one or both lender-of-last resort functions. The reason
is that the systemic risks are themselves the result of the use of central bank money as
a medium of transaction. Bank runs and financial contagion only arise because bank
deposits have a fixed price in terms of money and bank reserves of central bank
money are only a fraction of their nominal value. If bank accounts were simply shares
in asset portfolios with variable prices, the value of being first in line to withdraw funds
from a bank disappears and, hence, the incentive for a bank run. A rumor that a bank
might be financially unsound might still induce its customers to withdraw shares from
their bank accounts, but this would simply produce a decline in the value of their
shares (Cowen and Kroszner, 1994). Payment systems can still be divised in the
money-less economy envisioned by New Monetary economists, but since payments
would be exchanges of portfolio shares with variable prices, they would have to be
executed on a gross-settlement basis. Thus, if the emergence of a more perfect
financial system entails the demise of central bank money as the general medium of
transaction, it reduces the importance of systemic risk. Financial regulation to protect
consumers against the principal-agent problems from asymmetric information then
moves to the forefront.
  Technical and institutional developments in recent years have reduced the
importance of the risks related to the viability of payment systems (IMF, 1996b). A
number of countries have adopted real-time gross-settlement (RTGS) systems in31 See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), and Hartmann (1994, 1997) for reviews of this debate.
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which settlement is executed continuously and on a gross basis. The European
Monetary Union’s payment system, TARGET, will be of that type, too. The straight-
foward way to eliminate “Herstatt” risk is the introduction of “payment versus payment”
(PVP) systems, in which a third party assures that both parties to a transaction have
made their payments before the funds owed to them are simultaneously released (IMF,
1996a, 1997). One way to facilitate this is to extend business days in at least one
market so that business hours of markets in different time zones overlap. For this
purpose, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York started operating the Fedwire system
for a full 18 hours a day in 1997. Obviously, however, this approach has limits of
practicality. Alternatively, PVP systems can be operated by global clearing banks that
bridge the time gaps between business hours, e.g., through a cooperative
arrangement among national central banks (Emmons, 1997). A major difficulty with that
approach is that it requires close international coordination of regulatory arrangements
which we discuss below.  
V.2. Regulatory Approaches
The central focus of current regulatory standards is to assure the solvency of
financial institutions by maintaining a sufficiently high capitalization. High capitalization
insures the creditors against adverse shocks to the value of the institution’s portfolio of
assets. This is exemplified by the capital-asset ratios laid down in the Basle Accord of
1988.  Regulators wish to assure sufficient capitalization by imposing minimum capital
asset ratios on banks. To take into account the different risk properties of different
bank assets, regulators define fixed weights for different types of assets and different
classes of bank capital  (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). 
The basic problems with this approach are widely discussed in the literature.
31
Regulatory arrangements are incentive contracts between bank managers and
regulators. Imposing capital standards - which, if they restrict management behavior,45
have positive opportunity costs - on banks, changes the incentives and constraints
under which managers seek to optimize bank portfolios, and this in ways that are not
necessarily conducive to achieve the regulators’ objectives. Focusing on balance
sheet ratios attracts attention away from other important aspects of bank management,
such as internal risk controls and management incentives. Capital asset ratios may
induce banks to choose a higher share of risky assets in their portfolios. While
portfolio theory suggests that theoretically correct risk-weights for different assets can
be found;  these weights would vary with changing market conditions. More
importantly, incoherent risk weights, i.e., weights that are different from the
theoretically correct ones, create incentives that result in an increase rather than a
mitigation of systemic risk. Similarly, minimum capital asset ratios must be
distinguished from optimum capital asset ratios. Minimum ratios, while easily
verifyable, should only be used as a first-line tool to monitor bank performance. In a
more perfect, yet more complex financial environment, these considerations gain
increasing weight, implying that alternative regulatory approaches should move to the
forefront (Goodhart, 1996a).
Recent experience with bank failures, including large international banks,
suggests that weaknesses in the management procedures and risk controls of a bank
are more important factors behind failures than non-compliance with balance sheet
ratios (Goodhart et al., 1997). Specifically, Goodhart (1996b) explains how misguided
pay schemes and bonus arrangements for bank managers can induce excessively
risky management behavior. The Group of 30 reports survey results among bank
managers that indicate inadequate management procedure, failure of internal controls
and actions of rogue employees as the three most likely causes of bank failure.  This
suggests that regulation should focus more on management practices and internal risk
controls (GAO, 1994). In line with this, the Group of 30 (1993) report put forth a set of
management standards as a guide for good practice. In the US, the Federal Reserve
System and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency have issued guidelines for
bank examinors incorporating some of these recommendations. Key ideas are to
ensure that derivatives activities are (1) consistent with the bank’s overall risk46
management philosophy and strategy, (2) conducted in a safe and sound manner, (3)
overseen by an independent risk-management group with clear authorities (GAO,
1994).
Turning this insight to mean that regulators should draw up requirements for
formal management procedures, rules, and organizational structures would miss the
point. Such formalities can easily be implemented, but rather than their mere existence
what matters is that the spirit of the intended procedures is being followed. This is
much harder for regulators to verify (Goodhart, 1996a).
A basic problem with this is that different institutions have different corporate
cultures of risk management and different comparative advantages. Turning away from
simple balance sheet ratios therefore must imply a sufficient degree of flexibility of the
regulatory arrangement to allow for specialization and competition. An important
aspect of this is that institutions proving themselves to be equipped with better risk
management techniques should be subject to lower capital requirements to honor their
efforts for improved management. Two proposals have emerged to facilitate that. The
first, incorporated in the proposed amendment to the Basle Accord (Hartmann, 1997),
requires banks to choose a particular model of market risk management from a set of
allowable options approved by the supervisory authority. Using the model and
historical or simulated data to evaluate the riskiness of its portfolio regularly, banks
can determine the capital requirement needed to assure a sufficiently high confidence
level of achieving a minimum level of return over a given holding period. This
eliminates the need to define fixed asset weights as in the standard approach and the
related incentive problems. However, the approach still demands very complex
choices regarding the minimum level of return, the relevant holding period, the
parameters of stress-testing models and the like. Furthermore, it demands very
specialized expertise from the regulators and, where this is absent, the requirement of
official approaval may hamper the development of new and better risk management
models.47
The second proposal, developed at the Federal Reserve Board, relies on
precommitment to standards on the outcome of bank management decisions rather
than regulating management tools (Hartmann, 1997; Goodhart et al., 1997). Under this
approach, banks precommit to maximum cumulative trading losses over a certain time
horizon and are obliged to hold enough capital to cover those maximum losses.
Violation of the loss maximum are then subject to financial penalties. The advantage
of this approach is that it leaves the choice of risk management techniques entirely to
the financial institutions and, hence, frees the regulators from the burden of verifying
compliance with the approved techniques. The proposal also allows institutions to
choose from a broader range of models and techniques and, therefore, promotes
competition. One difficulty with the approach is that the threat of financial sanctions
may not be credible, if the fines are large enough to push an already troubled financial
institution over the brink of insolvency, and may not be effective, if the fines are small
or their payment can be postponed. A related difficulty is that the proposal might lead
to fines imposed on all financial institutions in times of a general market disruption.   
V.3. Institutional Arrangements
At the national level, division of regulatory responsabilities among industry-
specific agencies is obviously inefficient, when the borders between these agencies
become increasingly blurred. On the one hand, it creates competitive distortions if the
same business activity is regulated in different ways under different regulatory
competencies. On the other hand, getting a complete picture of the risk exposure of a
financial institution requires insight into the potential for spillovers from one functional
branch of the institution to another. Subjecting, say, the insurance brach of a financial
conglomerate to one regulatory body and the banking branch  to another implies that
both regulators may miss important information about the true riskiness of the branch
they are responsible for. To avoid such inefficiencies calls for a comprehensive
regulatory approach and for equal regulatory treatment of the same activities  (Padoa-
Schioppa, 1995). The obvious solution would be the creation of a single regulatory48
body with authority over all financial institutions, and the allocation of supervisory
functions at the level of the consolidated conglomerate rather than its branches. The
recent proposals for unified regulatory authorities in Britain (Securities and Investment
Board, SIB) and Korea (Financial Supervisory Board) reflect those principles (OECD,
1998; SIB, 1997).
There are, however, a number of difficulties with this. In practice, the
appropriate domain of a unified financial regulator may be difficult to define in view of
the fact that financial and non-financial firms are often closely intertwined and that
applying strictly the principle of equal regulation for the same activity would call for a
consolidation also of the regulators of financial institutions and those of financial
markets (Padoa-Schioppa, 1995). A unified regulatory super-authority may be
regarded as an institution too powerful and, therefore, not subject itself to sufficient
accountability. Abuse of regulatory power and internal administrative  inefficiency
would easily replace the inefficiency of the current, fragmented setup, with little hope
for better outcomes. A second problem is that a unified authority may end up using
inappropriate regulatory tools to solve specific problems. For example, an authority
administering both a lender-of-last resort function and overseeing risk management
controls may be drawn into using the former too frequently to save troubled financial
institutions, both because it would develop a more friendly view of the management
problems facing a bank than a lender-of-last-resort concerned entirely with systemic
issues, and because it may want to cover up failures of its own oversight functions.
A related problem with a unified authority is that it suppresses competition
among regulatory agencies. Where several agencies work side by side, institutional
competition can work and create incentives for each agency to work efficiently. With
regard to institutional competition on an international level, Herring and Litan (1995),
therefore, argue that given the minimum standards in place, individual countries
should be left with sufficient discretion over additional standards for other types of risk
not covered by international standards like the Basle Accord. While this would
certainly not provide a level playing field, it would facilitate regulatory competition and49
the discovery of superior mechanisms. Institutional competition also serves as a
safeguard against regulatory capture, as an agency developing too cosy relations with
institutions it is supposed to control would face criticism from other agencies. A unified
regulatory authority would be more strongly exposed to regulatory capture. 
Thus, there a good reasons also to refrain from full consolidation of regulatory
authorities. One way to strike a balance between consolidation and division of
authorities is to define the borders of regulatory domains according to functional
responsibilities rather than industry structures (Goodhart, 1996a). As we discuss
above in more detail, financial regulation can be functionally separated into consumer
protection and prevention of systemic risk, and the latter into financial contagion and
payment system risk.  
V.4. International Coordination
In an increasingly interdependent international environment, financial regulation
raises new difficulties. International ripple effects of national financial toubles have
raised the awareness of the necessity to coordinate regulatory activities (e.g., GAO
1994, Group of 30, 1997). But given the diversity of national regulatory practices, little
if any progress has been made in this direction beyond the Basle Accord.  The most
efficient solution would, in theory, be the set-up of a global regulatory authority
internalizing all spill-overs between national financial systems. But while all regulation
must, ultimately, be based on national legislation, the coordination of national policies
is the best achievable solution. 
International coordination of regulatory activities faces two basic problems. The
first starts with recognizing that regulation imposes costs on the regulated institution.
Differences in regulatory regimes are, therefore, the basis for competitive advantages
and disadvantages in international markets. Thus, in a system of open financial
markets, governments have an incentive to reduce regulatory burdens on their own50
industries to strengthen their competitiveness. This makes credible commitments to a
common set of rules and standards difficult. 
Second, the administration of regulatory tools such as deposit insurance and
lender-of-last-resort functions entails potentially large expenditures of tax money to the
creditors of financial institutions.  In view of this, governments have a bigger incentive
to protect domestic depositors against the risk of bank failure than foreign depositors.
Since a transfer of tax revenues to foreigners is not politically attractive, governments
can be expected to be reluctant to rescue foreign bank depositors and delay payments
or refrain from honoring their obligations altogether if the deposit losses are large.
The failure of the Italian Banco Ambrosiano SpA that was controlled by a Luxembourg
holding company illustrates the point. When the failure of the holding company brought
down the Italian bank in 1983, creditors of Banco Ambrosiano were treated more
favorably than creditors of the holding company (Herring and Litan, 1995).
Furthermore, governments do have an incentive to offer lender-of-last-resort protection
to foreign banks operating in their countries, since a run on or the illiquidity of a foreign
bank operating in the domestic market may spill over to the domestic banking sector.
Goodhart and Schoenmaker's (1993) survey of bank failures supports that point by
illustrating governments' interest in rescuing foreign-owned banks operating in their
domestic markets. However, governments are unlikely to care much about the ripples
financially troubled, domestic banks may cause in foreign markets, as illustrated by the
Herstatt case (von Hagen, 1992).  By implication, governments will be reluctant to
stand by as providers of lender-of-last-resort functions to domestic banks operating
mainly in foreign economies. This, in turn, means that the incentive to enforce
domestic regulation on banks operating abroad to reduce the risk exposure of foreign
lender-of-last-resort providers is weak, since the benefit of the enforcement falls on the
foreign government. 
These basic difficulties put a narrow limit on the scope of international
cooperation, which in practice becomes reduced to a case-by-case approach to joint
actions. One implication is that international coordination entails too many resource-51
costly rescue operations when financial institutions or systems come under stress, and
too little preventive action.  
Realizing the narrow scope for international coordination, the Group of 30
(1997) stresses the potential for cooperative arrangements among international
financial institutions. In a cobweb of international, interdenpendent financial relations,
each participating institution has an interest in understanding how its partners-
competitors manage their business as a condition to better understanding and
managing its own risk exposure. The Group of 30 thus argues that the “core”
institutions of the global financial markets should subject their operations to an
expanded review by a single, independent, external auditor, or agree on more
consistent and meaningful disclosure of financial and risk information, and cooperate
with national regulators to improve their monitoring capabilities of financial institutions
and their international activities. The relatively large degree of concentration of global
business acitivities on a small number of “core” institutions should facilitate such an
industry arrangement. Interestingly, the very process that undermines industry
arrangements at the national level would, in this view, promote an industry
arrangement at the global level. Private sector financial institutions have already
responded to outside pressures to publish additional information on their risk-taking
activities. A number of banks voluntarily disclosed more than legally required. Thus,
there is a tendency towards regulatory mechanisms that are relying on self-regulation
and reinforcement of market discipline (IMF, 1997). The BIS (1997) reports that
disclosure practices improved during 1996, particulary with respect to value-at-risk
data. While industry arrangements like this are certainly desirable, one may doubt that
they would go much beyond rules for a more standardized disclosure of financial
information in practice. 
Another example for market-based regulation and supervision as well as for the
limitations of this approach is the emergence of structured derivative product
companies (SDPC). As discussed above, these specialized OTC derivatives
subsidiaries are constructed in a way sufficient to gain a triple-A credit rating. Rating52
agencies, therefore, are used to assess counterparty credit-risk in the derivatives
markets and do hereby, in a way, serve as a market-based device for financial market
supervision. Events like the recent Asian crisis, however, which was not reflected in
any credit rating before the crisis actually occured, point to the weaknesses and
limitations of such an approach.
In the end, then, coordination among governments in the area of financial
regulation will remain quite limited. In a world of national governments and national
legislation, this is the price paid for a more global and more perfect financial system.
The recent financial market crises in Mexico and Asia, however, suggest, that more
stringent application of regulatory rules already in place at the national level could
have prevented much if not all of the damage. In fact, bad government behavior, such
as nepotism in staffing the management of financial institutions, deliberately lax
supervision of financial institutions to avoid taking unpopular action, and the extension
of implicit guarantees to financial institutions as part of ambitious industrial and
development policies, seems to be a large factor behind the financial crises in Asia.
Peer pressure on governments to enforce existing rules effectively, combined with
advice and incentives to do so, may, after all, be more promising than efforts to
coordinate the activities of national regulators.  53
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